Scott Consigny, “Rhetoric and Its Situations”
Consigny’s central claim is that rhetoric is the product of both choices made by the rhetor and the particularities of the situation. The rhetor is neither purely free, nor purely determined by the situation. If the rhetor ignores the context of a given situation his or her speech will fail, but there are myriad possible successful responses to any situation.
Consigny situates this claim in relation to the opposed positions of Lloyd Bitzer and Richard Vatz. He argues that Bitzer and Vatz each form one side of a dichotomy: Bitzer claims that the situation determines what the rhetor can say, whereas Vatz asserts that the rhetor creatively shapes the situation by choosing what information to include or exclude. Consigny offers a mediating position that synthesizes Bitzer and Vatz’s arguments.
To support his argument, Consigny appeals mainly to Aristotle. He uses Aristotle’s distinction between rhetor and expert to show that Bitzer treats rhetoric like problem solving and fails to account for the difference between a rhetor and a scientist. He also uses Bitzer’s own example of a presidential inauguration speech to argue that the rhetorical situation is an “indeterminate context” (178) that does not necessarily control what the rhetor says. Consigny also follows Aristotle in defining rhetoric as an art of topics, which enables the rhetor to determine what is “relevant and persuasive in particular situations” (181). His most persuasive evidence is a series of concrete scenarios—a meeting of the Daughters of the American Revolution in 1968 and a meeting of Bolsheviks in 1919—which reveal the flaws in Bitzer and Vatz’s positions. One could not address these two groups in the same way, but neither would these scenarios demand only one correct response.
For Consigny, rhetoric is about creating coherence out of chaotic situations. This view of rhetoric is a helpful way of approaching the classroom. Applying Consigny’s model to the classroom suggests that the teacher must seek the most strategic way of shaping the material, so that it will be received well by the students. There may be many effective ways of presenting information, but each will rely on topics for coherent structure.
Consigny’s conception of the topic as “formal opposition of terms” (184), however, seems too limited. In a situation defined by competing values, such as an election, structuring rhetoric around a formal opposition may be effective. Yet, other situations, such as a wedding or funeral, might be better suited to different kinds of rhetorical devices.
Hi, Josh. Now that you’ve read Bartholomae, do you see similarities in the way he formulates the idea of the commonplace with the way Consigny does? Would you say Bartholomae’s conception is more sophisticated?
Yes, absolutely. Bartholomae gives us a much clearer definition of the commonplace than Consigny: “A ‘commonplace,’ then, is a culturally or institutionally authorized concept or statement that carries with it its own necessary elaboration” (608). While this remains a bit abstract, he makes it concrete by showing how students unwittingly structure their writing around certain commonplaces. His conception of the commonplace, which “determines a system of interpretation that can be used to ‘place’ an example within a standard system of belief” (617), is the missing piece in Consigny’s argument.